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Abstract 
 
The deal-making process requires entrepreneurial actors to create and maintain wide networks of 
weak ties, while simultaneously developing stronger collaborative ties that will enable 
opportunities to be realized. We currently lack an adequate account of how these activities are 
integrated by deal-makers under conditions of risk and uncertainty. In an empirical study of deal-
making in early stage technology ventures, we find that deal-makers rely on different forms of 
trust in the early and later phases. Based on this study, we develop a process model and 
propositions on the role of trust in integrating strong and weak ties in deal-making.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Deal-making is a process, involving multiple phases (Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984), through 
which different entrepreneurial actors secure resources (make deals) in pursuit of entrepreneurial 
opportunities. Relevant actors (henceforth ‘deal-makers’) include innovators, investors and 
financiers, and professional intermediaries such as lawyers and technology transfer officers 
(Uzzi, 1999; Vohora et al., 2004; Payne et al., 2009). In this paper, our focus is on deal-making 
as a social process (i.e. encompassing those features of deal-making not explicable in terms of 
narrowly economic mechanisms (Venkataraman,1997; Eckhardt & Shane, 2003), involving the 
creation and exploitation of social ties.  As such, deal-making is viewed as encompassing two 
major strands of activity. First, deal-makers’ are engaged in selecting particular ties from a large 
number of weak ties available at the outset of the process (Karnoe, 2004; Macmillan et al., 
1987).  As previous studies indicate, deal-makers have to make decisions about a large number 
of propositions which are still at a formative stage, and which often lack clearly defined routes to 
production and market (Fiet, 1995; Mason & Harrison, 1999). In selecting from such ties then, 
the deal-making parties often lack first-hand, personal experience and may possess relatively 
little solid, verifiable information about each other (McKnight & Chervany, 2006). The ratio of 
ties selected to those rejected thus tends to be very high, with estimates ranging from one in 20 
(Mason and Harrison, 1994; Riding et al, 1993) to one in 3000 (Stevens and Burley, 1997) initial 
ideas actually proceeding to negotiation in the USA and the UK. 
Second, deal-makers need to develop strong collaborative ties that will support the 
intensive information exchange and joint problem-solving required between the parties 
(Auerswald & Branscomb, 2003; Shepherd & Zacharakis, 2001). As the development of stronger 
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ties necessarily takes place over time, it helps to establish a temporal order for the deal-making 
process (Harrison, Dibben, & Mason, 1997). Thus, the selection of ties in an early phase of deal-
making is followed by a later phase in which deal-makers support stronger dyadic ties that 
support collaboration and negotiation, and ultimately either exit from the tie, or  achieve 
successful completion (Fried & Hisrich, 2003; Eckhardt & Shane, 2003) .  
Previous work has developed a range of perspectives on this process.  Some studies focus 
on the decision-making criteria which investors apply to the selection of ties (e.g. Wright et al., 
2006). This work helps us understand the ‘filters’ which are applied to the selection of ties (Hall 
and Hofer, 1993; Maxwell, Jeffrey, & Lévesque, 2011). Other work emphasizes the means by 
which entrepreneurs secure resources through the information signals which they send to 
potential investors, thus highlighting the importance of information exchange within the process 
(Ahuja, 2000; Dushnitsky, 2010; Spence, 1974).  A further strand of work addresses the 
development of a particular collaborative tie between entrepreneurial actors (Shepherd & 
Zacharakis, 2001).  
In this paper, however, in response to recent calls in the literature (Welter & Smallbone, 
2006; Zahra et al., 2006), we seek to integrate and extend this existing work by addressing the 
role of trust in the deal-making process. To date, the great majority of previous studies have 
addressed this role in the context of the stronger, dyadic ties of the later phases of the deal-
making process (e.g. Liao and Welsch, 2005; Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984; Payne et al., 2009; 
Larson, 1992), and especially the collaborative and monitoring relationships post-investment  
(e.g. Harrison et al. 1997).  Relatively few studies have examined the role of trust in the selection 
of weak ties in the early phase (e.g. Welter & Smallbone, 2006).  This division within existing 
work means that little attention has been paid to one of the most important practical and 
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theoretical challenges posed by deal-making; namely, the question of how deal-makers maintain 
and integrate the networks of weak and strong ties involving in accessing and realizing 
opportunities. This challenge comes about because, on the one hand, the pursuit of opportunities 
requires deal-makers to devote significant time and resources to the wide network of weak ties 
needed to seek opportunities, and to obtain non-redundant information (Uzzi, 1997; Harrison et 
al., 1997; Granovetter, 1983). On the other hand, deal-makers need to concentrate their resources 
on developing the dense networks of strong collaborative ties capable of realizing such 
opportunities (Greve, 1995).  
The challenge of integrating these networks within finite resources poses some broad 
theoretical questions about trust and the role which it plays in deal-making.  A widely accepted 
definition of trust is “the intention to accept vulnerability upon positive expectations of the 
intention or behaviour of another” (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998: 401). One question 
which arises is whether, and how, trust supports deal-makers’ ability to efficiently balance the 
conflicting demands of these networks of weak and strong ties. Uzzi (1997) has highlighted the 
time economies and collaborative advantage created by the trust which emerges within strong, 
embedded, ties.  However, we know relatively little about the role of trust in the process by 
which certain weak ties become strong, collaborative ties. Previous work in entrepreneurial 
settings has failed to address this role adequately because it has been primarily concerned with 
the development of existing ties, thus failing to embrace the deal-making process as a whole. To 
address these issues, we set ourselves the broad research aim of exploring the role of trust 
throughout the deal-making process, including both the selection of ties in the early phase and 
their development in the later phase. In particular, we were concerned to identify how trust was 
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built amongst deal-makers in different phases of that process, and the effect of such trust on the 
way ties were selected and progressed.  
To explore these questions in more depth, we focussed our study empirically on a setting 
which represents an extreme case for both the selection and development of ties; namely, early 
stage technology ventures (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). As a result of the dynamic nature of 
technology and markets, deal-making in this setting is characterised by shifting networks of 
weak ties which are a product of the creation and destruction of large numbers of new ties 
(Auerswald & Branscomb 2003). At the same time, the commercialization of new technologies 
is subject to high levels of risk and uncertainty, helping to deter collaboration (Goldenberg et al., 
2001; Amabile et al., 2001; Faems et al, 2005). Yet, deal-makers need to make significant 
investments in collaborative relationships to be able to evaluate and progress particular deals 
(Gans and Stern, 2003; Rost, 2011).   
In this study, we found that trust was built in different ways in the early versus the later 
phase of the deal-making process. Also, deal-makers relied on these different forms of trust in 
deciding which ties to select and develop to a deal-making outcome. Based on the findings from 
this empirical study, we develop a process model of the role of trust which addresses some of the 
above-noted limitations of previous work. In particular, this view helps to account for deal-
makers’ ability to integrate both the strong and weak ties needed for deal-making, within finite 
resources of time and attention.  
 
TRUST IN ENTREPRENEURIAL SETTINGS 
Trust has been viewed from a wide range of different ontological and epistemological 
perspectives which have led to fragmentation in its conceptualization and a lack of integration 
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across studies (Inkpen & Currall, 2004). These divisions in the literature are difficult to 
reconcile, since as McEvily and Tortoriello (2011) note, they also reflect the context-dependent 
nature of trust and the diversity of settings in which it has been studied. In relation to 
entrepreneurial settings, however, trust has been widely identified as a positive factor in helping 
entrepreneurial actors to overcome the risk and uncertainty which afflict collaborative 
relationships in entrepreneurial settings (Welter, 2012). It is seen as limiting opportunistic 
behaviour in collaborative relationships (Uzzi 1996), reducing monitoring costs, and overcoming 
the information asymmetry between actors (Larson, 1992; Shane & Cable, 2002) by facilitating 
information transfer  (Harrison et al., 1997; Sapienza & Korsgaard, 1996; Payne et al., 2009).  
Despite the emphasis which is given to the positive role of trust in entrepreneurial 
activity, less attention has been paid to the question of how trust is built in different social 
settings encompassed by such activity (Welter 2012).  Previous studies here have tended, as 
noted above, to focus on trust building behaviours associated with the development of dyadic 
ties. Thus, Shepherd and Zacharakis (2001), for example, describe the emergence of trust in 
terms of a ‘gradual and incremental process of signalling commitment’ in a dyadic relation 
between partners (p.135).  Relevant actions include; signalling commitment and consistency; 
being fair and just; obtaining a good fit with the partner; and frequent and open communications. 
Similarly, Maxwell et al. (2012) describe a number of trust-building behaviours observed in face 
to face interactions between entrepreneurs and investors.  
However, studies of trust building within a dyadic tie have struggled to explain the 
paradox of how trust can be built in the early phase, when deal-makers are confronted by many 
possible weak ties and information is very limited (Aldrich & Fiol 1994; Zahra, Yavuz, & 
Ucbasaran, 2006; McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998).  Harrison et al. (1997) suggest that 
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the notion of ‘swift trust’ as found in temporary groups is relevant here, based on assessments of 
an individual’s trustworthiness (Meyerson, Weick, & Kramer, 1996). Other studies seek to 
address this issue with reference to a cyclical process of trust building which is initiated by an act 
of trust. Shepherd and Zacharakis (2001: p.135), for example, argue that trust is initiated by 
“initial act of vulnerability” when “one party ‘trusts’ the other (makes themselves vulnerable to 
the partner’s opportunistic behaviour)”. Maxwell and Leveque (2012) similarly outline a process 
of trust-building which begins with an investor ‘trusting’ an entrepreneur.   
The circularity implied by these ‘leaps of faith’ (Mollering, 2006; Welter 2012) seems an 
inadequate explanation for the competitive environment of early-stage technology ventures. 
More relevant to this setting are studies which acknowledge different forms of trust as applying 
to different social situations.  One highly influential framework here is provided by Zucker 
(1986) who identifies three major “modes” of producing trust. Firstly, “institutionally-based 
trust” is defined as the product of formal mechanisms, including, for example, the educational 
system, professional bodies, regulation and legal institutions. Because this type of trust “does not 
rest on personal characteristics or on past history of exchange” (p.61), it may be signalled via 
limited, but specific, information. Secondly, “characteristic-based trust” is seen as the product of 
social similarities such as family background and gender, and only requires “information 
concerning social similarity” (p. 61), on the basis that others with similar characteristics will 
share background understandings, smoothing exchange paths. Thirdly, process-based trust is 
seen as produced through a record of exchange between actors, and requires “a considerable 
amount of person-specific information” (p. 60). In outlining  these different ‘modes’ then,  
Zucker’s analysis relates forms of trust to the information which actors can acquire about each 
other, dependent on their relative positioning within particular social and institutional contexts.   
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Building on this and other typologies of trust, other authors have developed a processual 
perspective which relates the building of trust to the staged development of social relationships.  
Lewicki and Bunker, for example, argue that “trust develops gradually as the parties move from 
one stage to another” (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996: 124), taking on a different character in the early, 
developing and mature stages of a relationship. In broad terms, they see trust within a dyadic tie 
shifting over time from a calculative to a relational basis, encompassing the following forms of 
trust;  “calculus-based” (a calculation of costs versus benefits of the tie), “knowledge-based” 
(involving a history of interaction that supports mutual knowledge) and “identification-based” 
(where parties understand and appreciate each other’s wants).  
To address the role of trust in the particular empirical setting of the deal-making process, 
we adopted an inclusive approach which sensitized us to the different forms of trust highlighted 
above, as well as to the processual dynamics highlighted in previous work.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
Research Design 
Despite consensus in the definition of trust, it is widely seen as a difficult concept to 
operationalize in empirical work (Currall & Judge, 1995; Neergard et al. 2006). This is partly 
because of the different theoretical perspectives applied to trust (Kramer, 1999), but also because 
trust is a context-dependent and largely tacit phenomenon which manifests itself in different 
ways according to circumstances (McEvily and Tortoriello, 2011).  Surveys and experimental 
techniques are subject to a number of limitations in terms of their ability to explore the dynamics 
of trust development in context (Welter & Smallbone, 2006).  Alternatively, when highly 
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consequential case-studies are examined (e.g. Neergaard & Ulhøi, 2006), generalizations of trust 
may be impaired by the idiosyncratic features of a given deal process.  
Given these challenges, and the lack of previous studies of trust in this particular 
empirical setting, we chose an inductive, qualitative study design based on interview techniques 
(described below) in order to explore trust (what builds trust as well as its outcomes) in the deal-
making process. Our first challenge was to decide how to operationalise trust in our study. Some 
writers view respondents’ explicit references to trust, in interviews for example, as relevant 
evidence (Uzzi, 1997). However, such references are not only subject to social desirability bias 
(Welter, 2012), but tend to be associated with close, embedded ties – ties that may not 
necessarily be characteristic of early deal making. A recent study of investors and entrepreneurs, 
(Maxwell & Levesque, 2011) suggests that trust may be more observable when viewed in terms 
of concrete decisions and behaviors (e.g.”trust-building” or “trust-damaging” behaviors). Trust, 
itself, was operationalised in this study as a “decision variable”, whose operation could be 
inferred from decisions to accept risk by pursuing or not pursuing particular ties in response to 
entrepreneurs’ behaviors.  
In line with this approach, and to ground the concept of trust in our study, we decided to 
couple two well established approaches used in the social sciences to explore novel phenomena 
and process: grounded theory (Glaser, 1998; Lincoln & Guba, 1985) and the critical incident 
technique (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Neergaard & Ulhøi, 2006).  Key informants were asked to 
describe specific deal-making processes, both those that had been successful and those that had 
been unsuccessful or abandoned. We then focussed on critical incidents; i.e. specific instances 
where decisions to progress in, or withdraw from, the deal-making process were discussed. 
These incidents would provide useful data on actors’ acceptance of risk at different phases in the 
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deal-making process. At the same time, such incidents also help to contextualize the acceptance 
of risk by relating this to the other actors and the information exchanged.  Our detailed methods 
follow. 
Data Collection 
Data collection began with a preconception stage (Glaser, 1998), the goals of which were 
to identify the general elements of the deal making process and guide the development of the 
interview schedule for the second stage. Nine informants were recruited for “grand-tour” 
interviews (Spradley, 1979), of 1.5 to 3 hours, where they were asked open-ended questions 
about the deal making process, and the variety of key actors, artefacts and practices ‘typically’ 
associated with entrepreneurial deal making. These informants had long-established careers in 
technology venturing and substantial experience in various entrepreneurial roles. From these 
interviews, we collated comprehensive lists of actors and artefacts and developed a general 
process description of deal-making itself. We went from the accounts given by these key 
informants back to the themes identified in the literature to ensure that our interview schedule for 
the second stage was sufficiently open and inclusive.  
The second stage began by developing our semi-structured interview template (Kahn & 
Cannell, 1957), in which we used the critical incident technique (Flanagan, 1954; Spradley, 
1979; Chell & Allman, 2003). Here dealmakers were asked to outline multiple examples of early 
stage technology investments encompassing all phases of the deal-making process, ranging from 
those which had not got beyond initial contacts through to those which achieved successful 
commercialization. Interviewers generally discussed three salient examples of deals: (1) a deal 
process that went very well, (2) a deal process that went very poorly, and (3) a deal process that 
was terminated early. Some respondents discussed more than three deal processes. We recognize 
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that deal-making is usually a lengthy process. The advantage of focusing on “incidents” here was 
thus not to refer to a single discrete event but to focus our respondents on different concrete 
processes of decision-making that they had experienced. 
We conducted 27 interviews with dealmakers, each lasting around one hour (average) 
and conducted in the workplace of the informant. The interview template comprised two main 
sets of questions: (1) questions on phases – on finding opportunities and preselecting, or 
deselecting, potential partners and on selecting and further developing (or abandoning) an 
securing the deal; (2) questions on practice and processes – on what were the biggest factors 
(kinds of information and features of the key actors) that led dealmakers to pursue a deal further 
(or not).  
Because trust is an abstract and value-laden concept (Welter & Smallbone, 2006), we did 
not encourage interviewees to discuss it directly, although a number did spontaneously address 
it. Rather, as noted above, we tried to observe trust through informants’ explanations of the 
factors leading to their decisions to proceed (or not) on a deal (i.e. to accept or reject risk). Of 
course, these often included factors that were not much concerned with trust – for example, 
simply that the technology was ‘bad’ or that ‘there was no market for it’. While these are of 
course important, our focus is on trust-based accounts. To check for interviewee bias in such 
accounts, however, we also probed as to whether more straightforward technology or 
market/economics-based explanations could instead be sufficient to explain their decisions. For 
example, a venture capitalist, when probed on how important the technology was in progressing 
the deal, responded;  
“Actually I think more than anything it's judging individuals. So, more than 
anything, you back people, and this is where I come back to, what is the right 
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background of an individual? I'm not sure it's completely obvious because I think 
more than anything VCs have to judge people. I can buy in expertise on the 
technology”.  
All interviews were recorded and transcribed, resulting in 267 pages of usable transcripts 
and stories of around 90 different deals.  Purposeful sampling was used to identify respondents 
with a high level of deal-making experience, so as to avoid idiosyncrasies due to lack of 
expertise (Fiet 2007). Informants were identified through a combination of targeted (e.g. via 
professional bodies) and snowball sampling,  including from contacts identified in the 
preconception stage. Our sample thus included members of professional bodies in the areas of 
technology transfer, venture capital and angel investors. Of the 36 total informants, 8 were 
currently entrepreneurs, 6 were technology transfer officers, 6 were in corporate business 
development and licensing, 5 were angel investors, 4 were corporate venture capitalists, and 7 
were traditional venture capitalists. The study was carried out with a sample that included deal-
making actors in the United Kingdom and the United States. The role of national context is not 
the focus of the present paper, however, except to note that that, in relation to trust, our study did 
not indicate obvious differences between the two contexts.  
Data Analysis 
To analyse and present our findings (below) we deploy established grounded theory 
techniques used to good effect previously (in particular, Gioa et al, 2010; Pratt et al, 2006; Uzzi, 
1997). Our analysis aimed at identifying key features entailed in building (or breaking) trust in 
deal making ventures and at linking these features to the different phases of the deal-making 
process.  
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To analyse key features of trust building in the deal-making process, we began by 
identifying in our data set all of the statements that addressed the informants’ reasons for 
progressing (or terminating) deals and/or ties with other actors via open coding (Locke, 2001). 
Given the particular purpose of this paper, we then focussed on statements that pertained to trust-
based reasons/accounts (rather than more narrow economic concerns –see above). We then 
organized our data by drawing together similar kinds of statements to form provisional 
categories (first-order codes). These broader categories were adjusted periodically throughout the 
analysis until no further amendments or additions emerged. For example, statements such as “the 
first step is to judge their cv”, “I checked her credentials and thought ‘these look impressive’”, “a 
red flag is when they don’t seem to know the business”, were grouped together under the first 
order code ‘credibility/competence of the individual’. During this process we compared 
emerging themes with initial expectations from the literature, retaining some and abandoning 
others, in order to produce our emerging framework (cf. Uzzi, 1997). 
We then moved to axial coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1990), integrating first order 
categories into higher order, researcher-induced themes pertaining to the role of trust in deal-
making. For example, first order categories relating to “individual credibility/competence”, 
“team and/or company credibility/ competence”, and “other (weak and strong) ties verify 
credibility”, were grouped together into the theoretical theme of “assessment of 
credibility/competence”. Having determined a potential framework, we again went back to the 
literature and reexamined how far the original categories fitted with our emergent theoretical 
understanding (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Locke, 2001). For example, our observations around the 
importance of institutional signals chimed well with the concept of institutionally-based trust 
discussed by Zucker (1986).   
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Having identified features of trust building across the deal-making process, we moved to 
a comparison of process phases to see whether, and how, the role of trust varied across phases. 
Our “grand tour” interviews, supplemented by the existing literature, had revealed a set of steps 
typically taken in the deal-making process, ranging from opportunity identification and initial 
preselection of potential partners through evaluation of the merits of a chosen idea to deal 
finalization. To ease comparison and theorization, we reduce these for analytical purposes to two 
key phases, or episodes, in the deal making process: early phase and later phase (see Table 1). 
The early phase entailed the initial identification and preselection of deal-making opportunities 
to the point where a decision was made to put more time into pursuing a particular tie. Passages 
in deal-maker interviews (incidents) were thus labelled as “early phase” where they encompassed 
statements regarding investment opportunities coming to the attention of investor, the initial 
screening of potential ties and initial decisions by investors on whether (or not) to preselect and 
put more time into investigating a particular tie. The “later phase” entailed the further 
development and evaluation of the merits of a particular, preselected tie, including assessment of 
the tie and its proponents, development of the business plan, due diligence, and negotiations on 
the contract for a deal (cf. Riding & Orser, 2000).  
INSERT TABLE 1 NEAR HERE 
Following the approach taken by Uzzi (1997) we performed a ‘cross-site display’ by 
looking at the frequency of references to different trust features identified in the first step of our 
analysis (first order codes) for incidents labelled as ‘early’ or ‘later’ phase. While we are aware 
that this kind of data reduction approach loses data richness, it does provide additional evidence 
to support our emerging framework on the role of trust in the deal-making process (Uzzi, 1997). 
Data reliability 
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To try to ensure reliability in our analysis and resulting findings (cf. Lincoln and Guba, 
1985), we followed the two-fold approach described by Gioa et al (2010), based on ‘peer 
debriefings’ and ‘intercoder agreement assessments’. With respect to inter-coder assessments, 
one author took primary responsibility for coding but in discussion with a second author who had 
also been directly involved in the interviews. This provided an opportunity to discuss the scope, 
refinement and labelling of codes, as well as any ambiguities in the data, and helped to establish 
reliability, prior to one author completing the coding of the data. A representative sample of 
transcripts was then coded independently by two of the authors using the first order codes 
developed for the data-set as a whole. Following this, a selection of first order categories were 
independently sorted into second order themes. The level of agreement reached on coding for the 
13 first order codes was 81% , and overall for the five second order themes, a level of 85% - 
levels deemed acceptable for this type of study (Miles and Huberman, 1995; Boyatzis, 1998).   
Identification of phases was also discussed between two of  the authors on a sample of the 
incidents in order to check that the point between early (preselecting) and later 
(selecting/developing) could be reliably ascertained in our data, and also that it provided a 
reasonable point in the overall process to compare and contrast. With respect to peer debriefings, 
one of the authors played a more detached ‘outsider’ role in relation to data analysis, and so was 
sometimes able to point to ‘gaps’or  alternative explanations in the findings.  
FINDINGS  
Features of trust in deal-making 
Figure 1 shows the final structure and ordering of our coding scheme (first order codes 
and second order themes) for features of trust building found to be salient in interviewees’ 
accounts of deal-making incidents. Table 2 provides illustrative examples from the data of these 
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major themes that emerged from our analysis.  This analysis identified five important features of 
trust building in the deal making process as follows:  
1. Institutional signals –i.e. trust based on formal institutions and institutional 
mechanisms, not dependent on personal characteristics or a previous history of exchange (e.g. 
ties in high status institutions or grounded in formal IP processes).  
2. Position in social networks – i.e. trust based on an actor’s membership and 
position in relevant social networks, including (passive) introductions from other trusted (strong) 
ties in an actor’s network (e.g. referrals from friends and family) and more proactive 
involvement and information seeking in inter-organizational and intra-organizational networks of 
weak ties (e.g. emailing colleagues or external contacts to see whether they see potential in an 
idea or partner).  
3. Assessment of credibility/competence – i.e. trust based on a positive assessment 
of the competence and credibility of an individual entrepreneur and/or their team or company, 
including prior experience, skills, personal and professional background and domain knowledge 
as well as verification of their credentials by other ties (e.g. due diligence on a management team 
or company, verification of specific competencies by involving another expert with domain 
knowledge). 
4. Relationship between actors – i.e. trust based on the strength of the interpersonal 
relationships between actors, including their ability to collaborative on the development of a 
business plan,  shared expectations and the strength of the interpersonal relationship (for 
example, being willing to work together in putting a development plan and contract in place, 
sharing expectations about the terms of the relationship) 
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5. Information exchange– i.e. trust based on the timely exchange of information and 
the ability of the entrepreneurs to present that information in a skilful and timely manner (e.g. the 
ability of the lead scientist to articulate the key idea and its commercial potential).  Notably, 
while the content of information on the technology itself was of course important, this latter 
feature of trust was less about the technology per se and more about strengthening the 
relationship between the investor and the entrepreneur through a visible demonstration of skill in 
‘selling’ the technology, and showing a willingness to share relevant information openly. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 AND TABLE 2 NEAR HERE 
It is clear from our analysis that the trust which deal-makers relied on in progressing 
deals did not only come from dyadic relationships between actors or the information they 
exchanged (although these were undoubtedly important).  Assessments of actors’ competencies 
and credibility, as judged against relevant reference groups (e.g. those with ‘entrepreneurial 
skills’, ‘business acumen’ and ‘domain knowledge’), as well as their relative positioning within 
social networks, were also important facets of trust building.  Other important features of trust, 
however, were institutionally-based and stood outside of the perceived characteristics, networks 
and previous exchanges between particular actors. These institutional signals also played a key 
role in speeding investor decisions about the preselection and filtering of a few deals to pursue 
from the many ties available. They also helped investors decide where to look for potential deals 
in the first instance, with many references to ‘top institutions’ and ‘decent places’. 
We can relate the features of trust building found here to previous research on the 
development of trust in inter-organizational settings. This has highlighted, for example, the 
importance of trust building in processes of network formation (Ring & van de Ven, 1994), and 
the importance of ‘competence’ and ‘goodwill’ forms of trust in the development of inter-
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organizational research teams (Newell & Swan, 2000). Our findings resonate, in particular, with 
the previous work by Zucker (1986) outlined earlier. Thus major features of trust building in our 
study (the second order codes) broadly encompass all three modes of trust production outlined in 
Zucker’s framework. In particular, the ‘institutional signals’ identified in our study relate the 
distinctive features of our empirical setting (the importance of IP and scientific institutions, for 
example) directly to Zucker’s notion of ‘institutionally-based trust’.  Position in social networks 
speaks to the importance of social similarity and membership of shared networks as expressed by 
‘characteristic-based trust’. Similarly, our codes on positive information about the credentials 
and competencies of actors can also be related to characteristics-based trust. These assessments 
were drawn, at least initially, not from repeated interaction with entrepreneurs, but at arms-length 
(e.g. reviewing a CV, or asking others to check out someone’s credentials). They entailed 
judging an individual (or their team/company) against an implicit ‘ideal’ type of entrepreneur 
(with such comments as “they just had the ‘wow’ factor”). The importance of the relationship 
between actors, in contrast, can be readily related to process-based trust, as such relationships are 
the product of interpersonal interactions over time. Finally, the salience of information exchange 
in our coding can also be related to Zucker’s framework, inasmuch as her different ‘modes’ 
emphasize the centrality of exchanges of information between actors as a means of producing 
trust.   
While our findings do not map directly onto Zucker’s categories – which is not to be 
expected given the specificity of our empirical setting - her framework is broadly 
accommodating of the findings from our inductive analysis.   With due reference, then, to the 
particular nuances of our own analysis, in the remainder of this paper we employ Zucker’s 
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framework as an inclusive vehicle for further conceptualizing (and labelling) the different forms 
of trust displayed by actors across the deal-making process.   
The role of trust across deal making phases 
Table 3 shows the cross-site summary of frequency with which different features of trust 
were referenced in different phases of the deal making process, aggregated across accounts of 
incidents by deal-makers. This indicates the relative prevalence of references to institutionally-
based trust (institutional signals) in the early phase and, in contrast, to process-based trust 
(relationship between actors, information exchange) in the later phase of deal making.  
INSERT TABLE 3 NEAR HERE 
With respect to characteristic-based trust (based on membership of social networks and 
assessments of competencies, as judged against reference groups), this was frequently discussed 
in both early and later phases. However in the early, preselection, phase this typically entailed an 
actor ‘sounding out’ potential ties with other members of their (intra- and inter-organizational) 
networks of weak ties (i.e. “what do you think of this?”) and/or more coincidental referrals when 
coming into contacts with others (i.e. “you might want to check this out”).  In contrast, the later 
phase typically entailed more in-depth assessments of the competencies and credibility of 
selected ties. However, if the relationship (i.e. process-based trust) strengthened between 
investors and entrepreneurs, this initial assessment of characteristic-based trust could be 
confirmed or questioned. For example, one investor reported a deal that she pursued despite 
concerns about the commercial competence of the lead scientists:  
 “First there were just two academics. Our referencing backed up the idea that 
globally they were leaders in the power semi-conductor space but they did not 
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have the commercial background…the business plan they put together did not 
hold water, the projections were unrealistic, the financial requirements were 
unrealistic. But we introduced John [a local Chief Finance Officer]  to the team. 
He got on phenomenally well with them, saw the opportunity, worked alongside 
them…”.  
This interaction between trust based on assessments of competence (characteristic-based) 
and trust grounded in interpersonal relationships (process-based), while not the main focus of our 
analysis, echoes previous work on the role of trust in the development of innovation in inter-
organizational research teams (Newell et al, 2000), and reflects Zucker’s (1986) own analysis of 
the way in which process-based trust confirms, and is confirmed by, other forms. 
In the following sections, we present our findings in a more narrative form, which allows 
us to develop propositions related to particular features of each deal-making phase.  
Deal-making phases and propositions 
Early phase 
This phase encompasses, first, opportunity identification activities, including the 
involvement of a variety of deal-makers such as entrepreneurs, business development individuals 
and brokers.  The key artefacts circulated amongst them include papers, patents, technical data, 
PowerPoint slides and business plans. These artefacts provide more codified and public forms of 
information, and are used to identify potential deal makers. In this phase, potential deal making 
opportunities are identified, sometimes via individuals providing referrals and acting as brokers, 
or by actively searching for deals in networks of weak ties inside or outside the firm. As one 
corporate business development executive put it: 
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“ Some individuals come to us with ideas. Sometimes we have ideas of our own 
and we’ll go to different markets and groups and say ‘hey we really think you 
should spend some time working this area up’. And that sort of comes at the sort 
of wide end of the funnel. Sometimes ideas are crazy, and sometimes they’re not 
so crazy, and through that we work up a .. number of pitches that we think are the 
ones we can develop business opportunities around”. 
Initial introductions and meetings typically then follow where contact information as well 
as generic deal templates may be shared. Together these activities comprise the earliest phase of 
the deal making process and typically take only a few minutes to a few days. 
 We found that deal-makers were keen to interact with weak and potential ties in this 
phase. There was a concern to ensure ‘deal flow’ through such contacts, with some venture 
capitalists, for example, having meetings with up to 20-25 entrepreneurs a week. In this early 
phase, deal-makers were concerned with gathering and evaluating the institutional signals 
associated with a variety of weak or potential ties. As outlined in Table 3, we found 74 
references to such signals in the early phase, against 14 in the later phase.  Relevant institutional 
signals here included the presence of IP regimes, national institutions, legal systems, educational 
systems, professional bodies, quality and sources of technology.  
In this phase, social networks were widely seen as important in providing referrals. As 
one of our respondents observed; “Yes, clearly if a deal is introduced by somebody you know 
well and respect, then you're going to pay more attention to that than something which comes 
through from someone you don't know”.  As this suggests, referred ties were ‘given more 
attention’ in the selection process.  Thus referrals helped to provide the characteristic-based trust 
involving social similarity and shared understandings. As a US VC observed of potential ties; “ I 
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want to know who the person is. I want to know if he knows the people that I know”. In some 
cases, the involvement of a known individual was seen as significantly enhancing trust in the 
quality of a particular tie. One US VC observed of a deal, for example, that “these were neat 
ideas, but the wow factor was, Daniel.  Daniel’s a huge wow factor, he's very, very smart and 
very credible in the pharmaceutical and the biotechnology industry”.   
However, in addition to these referrals, deal-makers often referenced an impersonal form 
of trust that could be built through information on a tie’s positioning within the institutional 
context. Given the interest in early-stage technology, an important part of that context was 
affiliation with, or validation by highly regarded institutions, which was seen as providing an 
assurance of scientific excellence or novelty.  As one UK deal-maker put it:  “First, there were 
very strong academic institutions in that area so lots of clever people dreaming up new 
things….then someone might have a good idea to patent the thing. But you’ve got to make it 
happen”. Ties which failed to provide these signals of institutional trust were unlikely to be 
selected. As one US venture capitalist (VC) explained; “If you tell me someone’s been in his 
basement for ten years and has invented a perpetual motion machine, I’m probably going to be 
sceptical”. Another VC in the UK commented on the role which a Tech Transfer Office could 
play in helping to validate a new tie: “Our relationship (with the Tech Transfer Office) now is 
very much...they will phone up and say, 'we've got a project that looks like this, and it's sort of 
this shape … What do you think?' And if we say, 'well, sounds quite interesting,' then they'll start 
working”.  
The contrast in deal-makers’ responses to weak or potential ties – ranging from ‘crazy’ to 
‘sceptical’ and ‘interesting’ – suggests that institutional signals are helping to build their trust in 
the relative quality of particular ties, thereby influencing the selection of such ties from a wider 
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pool. This institutionally-based trust is a ‘swifter’ form of trust in that the information signals 
around different weak ties are readily available via one-way information exchanges, and thus ties 
can be readily compared and assessed. These features of deal-making in the early phase suggest 
the following propositions: 
i. In the early phase of deal-making, institutional signals help build deal-makers’ 
trust in the quality of certain weak ties relative to others.   
ii. Weak ties which signal such institutionally-based trust are more likely to be 
selected for further development.  
iii. Weak ties which build characteristic-based trust due to their social network 
positions are more likely to be selected for further development.  
Later Phase 
The later phase of the deal process involves several distinct activities, centred on the 
evaluation and realization of the potential deal. Thus, at the end of the early phase, there is 
usually a scramble to pull together materials; both those that are publicly available as well as 
proprietary information accessed via non-disclosure agreements. This activity will involve 
reaching out to a number of parties that were not introduced at the beginning. Some will be 
investors, but many will be technical specialists used to assess the quality and value of the 
technology. Key artefacts exchanged here typically include deal term sheets, confidential 
information, performance data, spreadsheets, prototypes and patent applications. At some point, 
evaluation gets to the point where a proposed term sheet for the deal is shared. This leads to 
often fraught and lengthy negotiations between and within the parties involved. If these 
negotiations are successful, the finalization of the deal can be quick (up to a week), but even 
during that time hidden information may come to light and have a significant impact on the deal.  
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In this phase of deal-making, decision-making concerns shifted away from the selection 
of ties to the question of how more developed ties could be steered towards a successful 
outcome. As opposed to the arms-length arrangements and the multitude of weak ties found in 
the early phase, the later phase involved much closer collaborative, dyadic ties between deal-
makers. The need for such ties was reinforced by the uncertainties attached to early-stage 
technology, requiring significant problem-solving efforts on the part of deal-makers. As one UK 
corporate business development executive described such collaboration: “We do our own 
research; they do some research; the tech transfer people do some research, and we sort of build 
a business plan together. But it's not always committed to paper. It's sort of committed into the 
strategy.” 
Building trust in the quality of these collaborative ties was no longer centred on the kind 
of information which could be freely signalled across weak network ties.  For one, the 
information which is relevant in this phase is more personal, as deal-makers become intensively 
interested in the kind of person they are seeking to collaborate with. Even though a dyadic tie has 
now been developed, deal-makers need to do ‘due diligence’ to be sure of the competencies and 
intentions of their potential partners. This interest is focussed on those personal attributes which 
are most relevant to developing the collaborative tie. One US VC explained how intensively they 
assessed individual entrepreneurs in this phase: 
“I mean, we do criminal checks on the key management.  I want to look over his 
CV.  I want to be able to truly look up his ********.  Has he …had wife or 
spousal abuse problems?  I’ll walk away from a deal.  I’ll walk away from a deal 
if I think the guy is 50 pounds overweight, smokes and has got a bad lifestyle, you 
know.” 
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A UK VC summarised their concerns with the entrepreneur’s personal attributes as 
follows: “What we're looking for is basically if the entrepreneur is up for the task …and that if 
he's going to be the type of person that can drive a business forward, so that there's a genuine 
desire to make a successful business”. The personal qualities needed to ‘drive a business 
forward’ were seen as important indicators of the quality of a collaborative tie. However, they 
could not be readily gauged from the objective, institutionally-based information which might 
help deal-makers to select from a pool of weak ties. It was not enough, for example, for a 
scientist to have a faculty position at a university. As one of our UK VCs put it; “The other 
things we look for...we've got to have the scientist who's committed and enthusiastic. If they see 
this as just a way of getting more grant funding, we're not going to take it further 
forward….They've got to want to commercialize it, and they've got to have a bit of a commercial 
view about what's happening in the market”.   
As outlined in Table 3, process-based trust thus emerges as a much more significant 
factor in the later phase of deal-making (a total of 108 references to related themes versus 21 in 
the early phase). This form of trust centred on the quality of these collaborative ties and was built 
through interpersonal relationships that developed over time, providing further information on 
the competence and reliability of other deal-makers. This information is specific to the tie, 
because it relates not simply to a collaborator’s competence and intentions, but also how well 
this fits with their partner. As one UK VC put it, there needed to be a ‘connection’; “I think that 
in order for a venture capitalist to invest, usually there will have to be a level of trust, which 
connects absolutely, immediately. It will be either a slightly strange or an extremely masochistic 
venture capitalist who invested in circumstances where that were not the case”. Reflecting this 
concern with fit, several deal-makers emphasized the need to feel ‘comfortable’ with a 
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collaborator as a pre-condition for further development of a tie. As one UK  business 
development executive put it; “We were able to establish a good working relationship quickly. It 
didn’t take a lot of socialising. It was just that we were the right size of company for them, they 
were right for us. The interpersonal chemistry worked, and worked very quickly”. 
A key consideration in determining the fit within these collaborative ties was matching 
deal-makers’ expectations. Shared expectations helped to build process-based trust as actors 
worked towards a common goal. Conversely, the emergence of conflicting expectations might 
lead to a breakdown in the relationship and exit from the tie. As one UK venture executive noted:  
“We weren’t comfortable doing business with them. They aren’t a partner; that’s 
the point. They weren’t prepared to be a partner and that’s OK. We were looking 
for a partner; they were looking to buy something in. It was just a wrong 
expectation.” 
In the later phase of the process then, deal-makers are developing a much smaller number 
of dyadic ties, and, as evidenced by references to ‘comfort’ and ‘chemistry’, are concerned with 
the quality of collaboration secured by these ties. Private information is now being intensively 
shared between a small group of deal-makers, and this information, and the way it is shared (i.e. 
an actor’s behaviour being itself evidential), informs the emergence of process-based trust on the 
part of the deal-makers. In this phase, trust in the collaborative, dyadic tie is built through 
information on the competences and intentions of other parties (cf. Pollock, Porac & Wade, 
2004). It is important to note, however, that the vulnerabilities expressed by deal-makers in this 
phase were not to do with the trustworthiness of their partner per se, but rather their intention or 
ability to contribute to the collaborative quality of the tie. Process-based trust around these 
intentions and abilities had to be built gradually during the development of the tie.  
28 
 
Characteristic-based trust complemented the importance of process-based trust in this 
phase, as deal-makers assessed and confirmed the competence and credibility of collaborating 
parties through information drawn from social networks.  Such networks were often exploited as 
a source of expertise to validate quality – drawing in ‘private information’ on the collaborative 
quality of the deal (Shane and Cable, 2002). One UK deal-maker, for example, observed how an 
individual specialist was brought in to “really kick the tires of the technology and the 
architecture”. In other instances, respected colleagues were involved in due diligence around a 
particular collaborative tie.  Where a dyadic tie was found not to build trust in these ways, or 
such trust was breached – as, for example, by the discovery that expectations are mis-matched - 
this could lead one party to ‘walk away from the deal’, as one of our respondents put it.  
These findings lead to the following propositions: 
iv. In the later phase of deal-making, reciprocal sharing of information on 
competencies, intentions and expectations builds process-based trust in the collaborative quality 
of strong dyadic ties.  
v. The greater the process-based trust between the parties, the more likely that a 
dyadic tie will be developed towards a successful outcome.  
vi. Dyadic ties which build characteristic-based trust through validation by deal-
makers’ wider social networks are more likely to be developed towards a successful outcome.  
These propositions have important implications for our understanding of the role of trust 
in deal-making. One important implication has to do with the impact of information exchange on 
trust-building. Our propositions suggest that in the early phase of deal-making, information 
builds trust in the relative quality of a weak tie by signifying something about that tie. This may 
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indicate the symbolic importance of information exchanges over their substantive content; an 
observation which finds support from recent work on the importance of ‘symbolic management’ 
for entrepreneurs securing resources (Zott & Huy, 2007). Even information exchanges which are 
apparently substantive in nature, such as the exchange of business plans, may play more of  a 
symbolic role for new ventures (Karlsson and Honig, 2009). In the later phase, however, deal-
makers are interested in the collaborative quality of a tie. At this point, the sharing of detailed 
private information required for collaboration, and the willingness and ability to share 
appropriate information, becomes an important ingredient in developing (or failing to develop) 
process-based trust.  
This difference between phases makes the timing and form of information exchanges 
critical, since information relevant to the collaborative quality of a tie, such as a business plan, 
may have a negative effect (signalling a lack of competence, for instance) if disclosed in the 
early phase when deal-makers are only concerned with the quality of a weak tie relative to 
others. One of our US VC respondents, for example, described how in the early phase of 
evaluating a possible deal he had been sent a ‘massive tome, a 200 page business plan’. He 
observed that ‘somebody had gone a little overboard’, and that he had decided not to proceed 
with that tie.  
This suggests a further proposition based on our study, as follows: 
vii. Information exchanges which build trust in the early phase of deal-making may have a 
neutral or even negative effect in the later phase.  
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DISCUSSION  
As outlined in Table 3, and in the narrative sections above, we found that forms of trust 
were differentially distributed across phases of the deal-making process. Taken together, with 
our discussion of the means by which trust is built, these findings suggest an important analytical 
distinction between early and later phases of deal-making, and between the different forms of 
trust which are built in these phases. This analysis is summarised in Table 4. The process view 
which emerges from our study can be contrasted with the tendency of  previous studies of trust in 
entrepreneurial settings to focus on the dyadic relationship between trustor and trustee, where the 
underlying dispositions of the trustor and the trustworthiness of the trustee are highly salient 
(Maxwell & Lévesque, 2011; McKnight et al., 1998; Rotter, 1980). This interpersonal focus can 
be contrasted with the way our study situates the building and effects of trust within the 
dynamics of the deal-making process, and particularly decisions about the selection and 
development of ties under conditions of risk and uncertainty. The interpersonal aspect of trust 
only emerged later in that process, and, even here it featured less in terms of the quality of 
personal relationships than as a consideration in assessing the collaborative quality of dyadic ties.  
This finding also reinforces the view that trust in persons is not generalized, but is focussed by 
particular situations and the decisions taken within them (Nooteboom & Six, 2003; Welter & 
Smallbone, 2006).   
In presenting our propositions in relation to distinct phases here, we are not suggesting 
that the deal-making process unfolds as two discrete steps. Rather, the aim is to elucidate the 
dynamic and temporal ordering of that process through an analytical comparison of distinct 
points within it. For any given pool of weak ties, progression between these points is gradual and 
subject to high levels of attrition. And while selection concerns predominate in the early phase, 
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and development in the later phase, these activities may co-exist, depending on the setting, for 
the greater part of the process.   
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
Information exchange and trust building 
In emphasizing the importance of information exchange over strictly relational means of 
building trust, our study builds on previous work which relates the strength of ties between actors 
to the quality or ‘bandwidth’ of information exchanged between them (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & 
Camerer, 1998).  Thus, Hansen (1999) found that weak ties offered advantages for the exchange 
of simple (i.e. codified and independent) forms of information, while strong ties were more 
suited to the exchange of complex (non-codified and integrated) forms of  information. Likewise, 
Uzzi and Lancaster (2003) found that weak ties were effective in providing access to ‘public’ 
information, but strong (i.e. ‘embedded’) ties were better equipped to handle ‘private’ 
information.  As they note: “Arm’s-length ties prompt the transfer of comparative, objective, and 
unrestricted information, while embedded ties prompt the transfer of idiosyncratic, interpretative, 
and restricted information.” (p. 393). In our study, we found that in the early phase, deal-makers 
were able to use information that was highly codified and compressed to confirm or disconfirm 
trust, thus helping to make rapid selections from amongst a large pool of weak or potential ties 
(cf. Shepherd & Zacharakis, 2001; Hansen & Haas, 2001; Uzzi, 1997).  In the later phase, the 
stronger ties between deal-makers helped to mitigate concerns about the opportunistic use of 
information (cf. Uzzi, 1996), and supported more reciprocal exchanges of complex forms of 
information within the tie - what Uzzi (1997) terms ‘fine-grained information transfer’.  
Our study suggests that this association found in previous studies between the strength of 
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ties and the bandwidth of information exchanges can be extended to encompass the function of 
such exchanges within the deal-making process. Thus, in the early phase we find information 
signalling through the use of codified, public forms of information. Because these information 
signals lend themselves to ready distribution and comparability, they help to build an 
institutionally-based form of trust which informs the rapid and low cost selection of ties. In the 
later phase, however, we see a greater emphasis on the intensive and reciprocal sharing of 
private information through the bandwidth of a stronger dyadic tie. This serves to contextualize 
and personalize information exchanges. For more developed ties, this sharing of information 
seems to be closely intertwined with the emergence of process-based trust, helping to activate 
what has been termed a ‘cooperative logic of exchange’ between the parties (Uzzi and Gillespie 
1999, p. 33).  
One further important implication of our analysis and propositions is to suggest a 
resolution for the paradox of tie development discussed earlier; that is, how trust is built in a 
weak tie in the early phase of deal-making, when information is limited and no previous 
relationship exists. Rather than the ‘leap of faith’ or initial trusting step proposed in other studies 
(Welter 2012; Maxwell & Lévesque, 2011; Shepherd & Zacharakis, 2001), our research suggests 
that institutionally-based trust can be built through information which, in effect, signals not the 
intrinsic quality of a particular tie (because so little can be known at this point about particular 
ties), but its relative quality compared to other ties. By informing the selection of ties for further 
development, the application of institutionally-based trust thus enables a more process-based 
form of trust to emerge around the strong collaborative ties of the later phase. Unlike the 
process-based account of trust development proposed by Lewicki and Bunker (1996) then, this 
explanation grounds the early phase building of trust in actors selecting between multiple ties, 
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and not in the dynamics of a dyadic tie.    
 
Implications for further research 
The process model outlined above helps to integrate insights from the different 
perspectives previously applied to deal-making. Our understanding of the decision criteria for 
investments, for example, may benefit from greater recognition of differences in the forms and 
costs of trust as deal-making progresses from a large number of arms-length ties to a smaller 
number of more exclusive ties (Baum & Silverman, 2004; Payne et al., 2009; Maxwell et al., 
2011).  There is also a need for further research on the expectations of success, and signals of 
credibility in the deal-making process for various stakeholders.  Work in these areas could 
respond to the recent call for research on the factors which build trust in different contexts 
(Welter, 2012), including early versus later periods in the development of a tie (McKnight and 
Chervany, 2006). In contributing to this work, our findings show how the temporal ordering of 
contexts influences both the building of trust and its outcomes.  
Further, while the deal-making process rather than network structures were the focus of 
our study, our findings on the role of trust also speak to research on the development of networks 
and relational embeddedness within entrepreneurial settings (Hite, 2004), by highlighting trust as 
in important enabler of the integration of weak and strong tie networks by deal-makers.  More 
broadly,  our findings on the importance of information exchange adds to an emerging strand of 
work which views information signals and social ties in these settings not as substitutes, as in 
previous work (Podolny, 1994), but as involving a complementary interplay between information 
exchanges and ‘network actions’ such as tie formation and selection (Hallen & Eisenhardt, 
2012).   
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CONCLUSIONS 
To return to the introductory questions of this paper, we have sought to establish whether 
and how trust could support deal-makers in integrating the networks of strong and weak ties 
required for successful deal-making. We observed in our study how deal-makers were able to do 
this by drawing on different forms of trust that enabled them to accept the risk and vulnerability 
involved in selecting and developing particular ties. The analysis of our empirical study 
suggested that three features of the role of trust were crucial to this outcome. First, signals of 
institutionally-based trust supported the initial selection of ties under conditions of uncertainty, 
thus overcoming the paradox of developing trust in a particular weak tie. Second, the 
development of ties over time enabled a new mode of information exchange (characterised as 
‘sharing’ versus ‘signalling’) which helped to build the process-based form of trust required for 
late phase collaboration between deal-makers. Third, we observed in our empirical study how 
deal-makers relied differentially on forms of trust across phases of deal-making. This shift 
between different forms of trust seems to have enabled deal-makers to operate more efficiently – 
exploiting the cheapest available information sources to gain the positive benefits of trust 
without incurring too many of its costs. Thus, where previous studies have suggested that trust is 
an unavoidable necessity in early stage entrepreneurial settings because of a lack of information 
(Aldrich & Fiol, 1994), our study suggests a more positive view; that gathering the information 
to build different forms of trust helps deal-makers to better contextualize and exploit the 
information available in different phases of the deal-making process.  
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This study is not without limitations. Its qualitative approach limits its generalizability 
(Yin and Campbell, 2003). The use of interview data around critical incidents helps to provide an 
insight into the deal-making process as a whole, but at the expense of our ability to quantify the 
variables involved, or to track that process or associated network ties longitudinally.  
Policy and practitioner implications 
Although exploratory, the findings of our study have important implications for actors 
involved in the deal-making around early stage technology ventures. For public policy makers, 
our discussion of the role of institutionally-based trust highlights the need for strong institutions 
in relation to intellectual property, corporate governance, and technology transfer to economize 
on the information needed to build trust in the early phase of deal-making.  
For entrepreneurs and investors, our study underlines the social and networked character 
of the deal-making process. Deal-makers’ willingness to invest time and accept opportunity costs 
is based on initial assessments of certain ties relative to other ties. To influence investors’ 
decision-making, therefore, entrepreneurs need to build trust gradually by linking the kinds of 
information exchanged to a form of trust appropriate to the strength of their relationship. This 
involves attuning their information exchanges temporally, symbolically and materially to 
particular phases of deal-making. This may be more of a challenge for new entrepreneurs than 
investors in the early-stage technology arena, but our analysis of what builds trust applies to both 
sets of actors.  Entrepreneurs need to put potential investors through a due diligence process as 
well, and not base their trust on the possession of financial resources alone.  
While the analysis presented here is not a normative one, it does suggest that by relying 
on different types of trust, investors will be more efficient and effective in exploiting the wide 
range of weak ties needed for the sourcing and evaluation of opportunities. This reduces the risk 
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of ‘over-trusting’ (Zahra et al., 2006) by allowing deal-makers to make better and cheaper use of 
the information available in selecting ties, thereby limiting investments in time and resources to 
higher quality opportunities.  
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Table 1: Activities at Different Phases of the Deal-Making Process 
Activity Artefacts Actions People /Expertise 
EARLY PHASE 
Opportunity 
Identification/ Creation 
Papers, patents, technical data, 
power point slides, business plans 
Email, phoning, websites, triage Business development, technology 
broker, entrepreneurs, high legal 
expertise (for lawsuits) 
Introduction/Facilitation Business cards, contract template, 
non-disclosure agreement 
Referral, conference call, 
meeting, face to face, facilitation.  
Broker, moderate technical expertise, 
low legal expertise, senior 
management figure 
LATER PHASE 
Evaluation Term sheet, confidential 
information, performance data, 
spreadsheets, prototypes, patent 
applications  
Proposing, combining general 
terms with specific case 
Contract specialists, high technical 
expertise, business and financial 
expertise 
Initial Negotiation of 
contract 
Draft contract with terms Negotiating between parties, fluid 
across boundary discussion 
Moderate business and legal expertise 
Revision and completion 
of contract 
Revised and final  contracts 
 
Reviewing negotiations, trouble 
shooting, accepting & signing if 
problems overcome 
Senior  business and legal expertise 
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Table 2. Features of Trust Building in Deal Making (Selection and Development): Illustrative Data 
Sources of Trust 
Building 
Illustrative examples from the data 
INSTITUTIONAL SIGNALS 
Technology/idea 
from a reputable 
institution 
I think the fact that the technology comes out of a university is a very good starting point….You know, you 
tell me someone’s on the faculty at a decent university, I’m going to listen. 
So I need to go to the best universities in the world and see what they have… 
IP strategy in 
place 
Well, if we knew there was going to be a red flag in the way [referring to IP] from the start - you know, 
someone was going to put a stranglehold on us - clearly we wouldn't go with that. 
Very first thing we did was check is the idea defensible with patents. 
POSITION IN SOCIAL NETWORKS 
Introduction by a 
trusted (strong) tie 
It was basically just friends and family, so it was personal connections. 
How I found out about X was from a professor friend of mine made a business trip to London.  He is a 
professor at Imperial College, and he said oh, there is this guy you should meet… 
Interorganizational  
networks 
OK, so number one put yourself out there in a position where you can see deals and where people might 
even come to you.  So not only are you out there networking, looking, but you’re in a position where they 
know and trust you. 
People came to me at Top University (pseudonym) not only because of my title and position and success 
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but because other inventors would say to them, here’s a person you can talk to who’s going to be honest 
and fair and direct 
Intraorganizational 
networks 
We put together a preview paper to give colleagues – a kind of heads up – and took soundings on the back 
of it, ‘did this look interesting?’, ‘should we be spending more time there?’ and there was a colleague in 
the US who knew some of them also… 
… there was a nagging doubt in my mind [about a promising deal] because the company had been around 
for four, five years and still had pretty poor traction in the market. So I contacted colleagues and asked for 
their view – just a quick kind of email… So, you know, within 48 hours, after one presentation and a quick 
kind of sanity check with colleagues we rejected it. 
ASSESSMENT OF CREDIBILITY/COMPETENCE 
Individual 
credibility/ 
competence 
A red flag in selecting someone is if he doesn’t know what’s going on in his industry.  If he is in, let’s say, 
blade computing and I ask him how his product compares to three or four others and he doesn’t know who 
they are, that means he hasn’t kept up. …If he says, ‘this is a product that Goldman Sachs and CSFB need 
because of XYZ on their trading floor’ and he’s got that pretty right, I’m willing to listen to some more. 
I want to know who the person is.  I want to know if he knows the people that I know… or is he just 
describing a problem from 30,000 feet and doesn’t particularly know the answer….  You know, maybe he 
lacks domain knowledge.   
Team and/or 
company 
credibility/ 
competence 
I have to verify every statement you say and if it’s a great company, and I’m sure it will be, it won’t even 
matter if it turns out to be a bad company and then people are going to say, did you do your due diligence 
and if I didn’t do it then I ought to be taken out and hanged. 
I want to check out everything about the team.  I want to find out, do they work together?  ….And, if I find 
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things that I don’t like, I’ll walk… 
Other (weak and 
strong) ties verify 
credentials 
There was a colleague in the US, a guy called David Silver, in particular who knew some of them also, the 
semi experts. I forget his background; prior, I think he was actually investment banking, but he's got a 
good background in the whole semi space. Yes, so he helped out with the due diligence 
In parallel in terms of our due diligence on the opportunity, we met with potential customers. So, I flew to 
Scotland with the team and met a potential customer 
 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACTORS 
Shared 
expectations 
Logically that’s the time you start thinking ‘how is this deal going to work’? It was only at that point, when 
we got into the licensing deal, when we began to realize that our expectations and their expectations were 
opposite. We just were pointing in opposite directions. There was no basis for negotiation or compromise 
so we had to say goodbye. 
If you get to the point where you and the entrepreneur have a shared vision about how the future could roll 
out, then you’ve got a couple of options… Then we just pick up the phone and start networking. 
Collaborative 
development of 
business plan  
So, we introduced John to the team; he got on phenomenally well with them; saw the opportunity, and 
actually took on an interim CEO role. So, that probably would have been March, April, 2002. So, that was 
one thing; so, John then worked alongside the guys putting the business plan together.   
When we get a proposal, it's nearly always, 'here's a scientific paper, a patent and a scientist,' and the 
commercial bit has to be built. So, if we have a commercially-minded scientist, it helps because he can say, 
'I can see the potential for my invention to do this.' If he can't see it, we will try and find people from the 
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industry as consultants who can. If, at the end of the day, none of us can see a commercial opportunity, 
that's when we stop. 
Strength of 
personal 
relationship  
Generally, I don’t think it makes a huge amount of sense to do venture capital deals very, very fast. It's 
important for us to get to know the entrepreneur and to get to trust the entrepreneur. It's important for the 
entrepreneur to get to know us and get to trust us. 
If we can't get comfortable with the people and feel that we can work with them, we would quite quickly 
decline the opportunity because, particularly, when you're investing at a very early stage in a business, the 
impact of personalities and personal chemistry on the success of the business is disproportionately high. 
INFORMATION EXCHANGE 
Skilled 
presentation by 
entrepreneur/team 
The PowerPoint is a very, very important tool.  You know, we're like a customer, you know?  … the 
presentation becomes very skilled, and we do see where there's some weak points very quickly 
Unless you have them personally articulate what they're trying to achieve, whether it's in a conversation 
or a PowerPoint, or whatever, you have no idea what you're working with, because really it's, at this 
stage, all about the people. 
Timely 
information 
sharing by 
entrepreneur/team 
I said, “you know, run rate’s a very strange metric because if someone gave you  $1.50 three seconds ago, 
on a run-rate basis that could be $6 million. I want to see the books”. “No, I can’t show you the books”.  I 
said, “well, you have $6 million of my money.  I have to look at the books.  I have to verify every statement 
you say”. We turned down the deal. The next VC came along and the firm said ”Oh, we better show people 
our books” and they did and they made a fortune. 
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Figure 1. Features of Trust Building: First Order Codes and Second Order Themes 
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Table 3: Summary of Cross-Site Evidence for Different Features of Trust in Early and 
Later Phases of Deal Making 
  Early 
Phase 
Later 
Phase 
 
INSTITUTIONALLY
-BASED TRUST 
 
Institutional Signals (TOTAL)  Technology/idea form reputable institution  IP strategy in place 
 
74 
24 
50 
16 
  0 
16 
 
CHARACTERISTICS
-BASED TRUST 
Position in Network (TOTAL)  Introduction by trusted tie  Inter-organizational network  Intra-organizational network 
 
95 
 
18 
34 
33 
42 
 
2 
10 
30 
Assessment of credibility/competence (TOTAL)  Individual credibility/competence  Team credibility/competence  Other ties verify credibility 
 
32 
 
19 
  1 
12 
70 
 
25 
33 
12 
 
PROCESS-BASED 
TRUST 
Relationship between actors (TOTAL) 
  Shared expectations  Collaborative development of  business plan  Strength of interpersonal relationship 
 
7 
 
4 
0 
3 
71 
 
11 
28 
32 
Information Exchange (TOTAL) 
  Skilled presentation of information/exchange 
by entrepreneur/team  Timely information sharing by 
entrepreneur/team 
14 
 
10 
 
4 
37 
 
29 
 
8 
*(Numbers indicate references to different features of trust building aggregated across 
interviewees) 
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Table 4 : Building trust in phases of the deal-making process 
 Early phase Later phase 
Primary role of trust in 
deal-making 
 
Selection of ties Development of ties 
Predominant forms of 
trust 
Institutional and 
characteristic-based 
Process- based and characteristic-
based 
 
Information exchanges  
relevant to building trust 
Information signalling 
across network ties 
Information sharing between 
actors within a dyadic tie 
 
Costs of adverse selection  Opportunity costs of other 
weak ties 
Sunk costs of the developed strong 
tie 
 
Sources of trust  Comparative, public 
information on the relative 
quality of  a tie based on 
institutional factors and 
positioning in social 
networks  
Tie-specific, private information 
on the quality of collaboration 
between actors within a dyadic tie, 
based on interpersonal interaction 
and validation by social networks  
  
 
 
 
